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FILE No. NEQ 3/303/1 (Part)

DELEGATIONS

TITLE: VISITS OF GOVERNMENT PARTIES
OF IRAQ FROM IRAQ TO SOVIET UNION.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 115 OF 10 FEB 72 INFO ROUTINE TO
BEIRUT, KUWAIT, TEHRAN AND SAVING TO PEKING.

RECEIVED IN
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11 FEB 1972

NEQ 3/303/1

1. THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER FOR 10 FEBRUARY CARRIES A REPORT
THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
COMMAND COUNCIL AND DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE REGIONAL
(IE IRAQI) LEADERSHIP OF THE BA'ATH PARTY "IS TODAY HEADING"
A PARTY AND GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATION ON A VISIT TO THE SOVIET
UNION AT THE INVITATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
CPSU AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

2. OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION ARE :

- A. ABDUL BAQI, THE FOREIGN MINISTER.
- B. MUHAMMAD FADHEL, HEAD OF THE RCC'S PUBLIC AFFAIRS BUREAU.
- C. DR FAKHRI QADDOURI, A MEMBER OF THE RCC'S ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS BUREAU.
- D. SHADHEL TAQA, JOINT UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
- E. AMMASH, FORMERLY VICE-PRESIDENT AND NOW IRAQI AMBASSADOR
IN MOSCOW.
- F. THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF.
- G. THE COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE.
- H. THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL IN THE MFA.

3. (A) WAS THE LEADER OF THE IRAQI TEAM IN THE RECENT
NEGOTIATIONS WITH IPC. HE AND (B) ARE ALSO BOTH MEMBERS
OF THE REGIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY.

4. (A) AND (C) WERE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WHICH
VISITED CHINA IN DECEMBER 1971/JANUARY 1972 (MY LETTER
OF 22 DECEMBER TO MISS BECKETT (NOT TO ALL)).

5. FCO PASS SAVING TO PEKING.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 118 OF 10 FEB 72. INFO ROUTINE
TO MOSCOW KUWAIT BEIRUT AND TEHRAN AND SAVING TO PEKING.

MY TELNO 115: ^① SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

IRAQI NEWS AGENCY'S LATEST BULLETIN ALSO LISTS SA'ADOUN
HAMMADI, MINISTER OF OIL AND MINERALS, AS A MEMBER OF THE
DELEGATION.

2. IT ALSO SAYS THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE ACCOMPANIED
BY "AN INFORMATION TEAM".

3. FCO PASS SAVING TO PEKING.

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PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO 121 OF 11/2 INFO BEIRUT, KUWAIT
TEHRAN AND SAVING TO PEKING.

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MY TELS NOS 115 AND 118: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW NE 92/303/1

1. THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER FOR 11 FEBRUARY LISTS TWO FURTHER
ADDITIONS TO THE DELEGATION:

- A. DR FADHEL CHALABI, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF OIL AFFAIRS
- B. HASSAN AL NAJAFI, DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE AT
THE CENTRAL BANK OF IRAQ.

2. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ ALSO TRAVELLED ON THE SAME
PLANE.

3. IN A STATEMENT TO THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY AT BAGHDAD AIRPORT
BEFORE HE LEFT SADDAM SAID:

'THE PURPOSE OF OUR VISIT MAY BE DESCRIBED AS THE INTENTION
TO DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE OBJECT OF MOVING THEM
FORWARD IN A MANNER SERVING THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE ARE
CONSTANTLY CONCERNED TO IMPROVE.....THE VISIT TAKES PLACE
IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH OUR ARAB NATION IS CONFRONTED
BY MORE THAN ONE PROBLEM.IT IS ONLY NATURAL
THAT THE POINTS DUE TO COME UP FOR DISCUSSION WILL HAVE A
BEARING ON THE DESTINY OF THE ARAB NATION. ON TAKING UP ANY
ISSUE, WE DO NOT, AS A MATTER OF RULE, APPROACH IT FROM A
PURELY IRAQI ANGLE BUT RATHER FROM A PAN-ARAB ANGLE HOLDING IT
TO BE PART AND PARCEL OF THE MAIN BODY OF OUR ARAB CAUSES. IN
THIS WE ARE IMBUED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF OUR PARTY, THE ARAB
BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY'.....'OUR VISIT TO THE FRIENDLY
SOVIET UNION COMES IN THIS PERSPECTIVE AND WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THE COMMON DESIRE OF BOTH SIDES TO DEVELOP MUTUAL
RELATIONS TO THE BETTER'.

4. THE PAPERS NOT THAT THIS IS HIS SECOND VISIT TO MOSCOW,
THE FIRST HAVING TAKEN PLACE IN AUGUST 1970.

5. FCO PASS SAVING TO PEKING

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(Date) 12.2.72

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repeated for information to BEIRUT, KUWAIT, TEHRAN

SAVING TO: PEKING

BAGHDAD TELEGRAMS NUMBER 115, ^{118 and 121,} NOW REPEATED TO YOU:
VISIT OF HIGH LEVEL IRAQI DELEGATION TO MOSCOW

1. The Counsellor of the Iranian Embassy drew our attention today to the composition and wide range of functions of the delegation under Saddam Hussein. We said we could not ^{yet hazard a} guess ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~main~~ ~~purpose~~ of the Iraqi visit, but might be able to learn something from the communiqué, if one was issued, at the end of the delegation's stay.

2. As the Iranians are bound to ask us again ^(the intention behind and results of) for our analysis of the visit, grateful if you would report by telegram anything you may be able to learn about ^{it,} ~~the visit~~ and, in due course, any communiqué or statement released ~~in Moscow~~ by either party.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

①

Mr. Smith

②

Miss

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TO PRIORITY MOSCOW TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 11 FEBRUARY. INFO BEIRUT
KUWAIT TEHRAN INFO SAVING PEKING.

BAGHDAD TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 115, 118 AND 121, NOW REPEATED TO YOU:

VISIT OF HIGH LEVEL IRAQI DELEGATION TO MOSCOW.

1. THE COUNSELLOR OF THE IRANIAN EMBASSY DREW OUR ATTENTION TODAY TO THE COMPOSITION AND WIDE RANGE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE DELEGATION UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SAID WE COULD NOT YET HAZARD A GUESS AT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE IRAQI VISIT, BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO LEARN SOMETHING FROM THE COMMUNIQUE, IF ONE WAS ISSUED, AT THE END OF THE DELEGATION'S STAY.

2. AS THE IRANIANS ARE BOUND TO ASK US AGAIN FOR OUR ANALYSIS OF THE INTENTION BEHIND AND RESULTS OF VISIT, GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD REPORT BY TELEGRAM ANYTHING YOU MAY BE ABLE TO LEARN ABOUT IT, AND, IN DUE COURSE, ANY COMMUNIQUE OR STATEMENT RELEASED BY EITHER PARTY.

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TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELNO 125 OF 14/2 INFO BEIRUT, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO PEKING.

① MY TELNO 115: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

1. THE PRESS FOR SUNDAY 13 FEBRUARY CARRIES THE TEXT OF THE SPEECHES BY SADDAM AND KOSYGIN AT A LUNCH ON 11 FEBRUARY. IT ALSO CARRIES A REPORT THAT BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY AND KOSYGIN HAVE ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO VISIT IRAQ TO ATTEND THE CEREMONY TO BE HELD ON 1 APRIL AT THE NORTH RUMAILA OIL FIELD TO MARK THE START OF PRODUCTION BY THE IRAQ NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (INOC). THE PAPERS ALSO CARRY A TEXT OF THE COMMENTARY BY RADIO MOSCOW ON THE SPEECHES AND ON IRAQ/SOVIET RELATIONS.
2. THERE WAS ALSO A SHORT REPORT ON THE OPENING OF THE BILATERAL TALKS GIVING THE PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE AND A LIST OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.
3. THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER FOR 14 FEBRUARY REPORTS THE DEPARTURE ON THE 13TH OF A DELEGATION FROM THE IRAQ/SOVIET FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION LED BY NAI'M HADDAD A MEMBER OF THE BA'ATH PARTY'S REGIONAL (I.E. IRAQI) LEADERSHIP AND SALEH AL YUSIFI, MINISTER OF STATE. IN A STATEMENT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, HADDAD SAID THE VISIT WOULD BE "A SUPPLEMENT TO THE VISIT OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT DELEGATION".
4. "AL THAWRA", THE BA'ATH PARTY NEWSPAPER, PUBLISHED AN EDITORIAL ON 13 FEBRUARY IN WHICH IT POINTED TO THE PARTY'S VIEW ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS BEING GOVERNED BY ITS UNYIELDING STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, ZIONISM AND REACTION. TO THIS END IT HAD CULTIVATED RELATIONS WITH "WORLD REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN GENERAL AND THE SOVIET UNION IN PARTICULAR" AND CITED ITS RECOGNITION OF THE GDR AND ITS SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AS EXAMPLES. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT, THE PAPER SAYS, THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR SOVIET / IRAQI RELATIONS TO BE STRENGTHENED TO "THE DEGREE OF A FULLY-FLEDGED STRATEGIC ALLIANCE" SHOULD BE SEEN. *ph*
5. A SIMILAR

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5. A SIMILAR EDITORIAL APPEARS IN THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER FOR TODAY
14 FEBRUARY.

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TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELNO 126 OF 14/2 INFO MOSCOW AND STOCKHOLM.

⑤
MY TELNO 125 (NOT TO STOCKHOLM): SADDAM HUSSAIN'S VISIT
TO MOSCOW.

1. ALTHOUGH OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE SWEDES PERMITS US TO
RECEIVE (AND SEND) POLITICAL COMMENT INSEPARABLE FROM COMMENT
ABOUT THE SUBJECTS WITH WHICH THIS INTERESTS SECTION IS
CONCERNED, COMMERCIAL, CONSULAR, ETC, I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT
FEEL THAT REPORTS ON THE CURRENT VISIT WOULD BE SO HIGHLY
POLITICIZED, EVEN WHEN DEALING WITH ECONOMIC MATTERS, THAT
IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO SEND THEM HERE. I THEREFORE ASKED
THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IF HE WOULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO US
RECEIVING SUCH REPORTS AND HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT.

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TO IMMEDIATE F C O TEL NO.. 209 OF 14 FEBRUARY 1972, INFO ROUTINE
TEHRAN ,BEIRUT ,KUWAIT .

SAAF

SAVING, PEKING, ABU DHABI ,DUBAI ,BAHRAIN,ALGIERS,
TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

SADDAN HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW ..

oil dept.

BAGHDAD TEL NO. 120 OF 11 FEBRUARY PARAS 4 - 6.

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1. PRAVDA ON 12 FEBRUARY PUBLISHED AN EXCHANGE OF SPEECHES BETWEEN KOSYGIN AND SADDAN HUSSEIN WHICH THROWS SOME LIGHT ON THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT AND THE STATE OF SOVIET/IRAQI RELATIONS .KOSYGIN'S SPEECH WAS DEVOTED LARGELY TO A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND A RE-STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION FOLLOWING SADAT'S VISIT .IT ALSO DEALT WITH THE QUESTION OF ARAB UNITY AND NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE GROWTH OF POPULAR LIBERATION MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS. ON THE IRAQI REGIME KOSYGIN WAS RATHER MORE RETICENT THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED ON SUCH AN OCCASION .THE FOLLOWING IS A QUOTATION OF THE RELEVANT SECTION OF HIS SPEECH : '' WE SEE THAT IMPORTANT CHANGES ARE ALSO-TAKING PLACE IN THE LIFE OF THE IRAQI REPUBLIC .THE EFFORTS OF THE BA-ATH PARTY AND OTHER PROGRESSIVE PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS IN IRAQ DIRECTED TO -WARDS THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FRONT OF ALL PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN THE COUNTRY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FACILITATE THE MOVEMENT OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE ALONG THE ROAD OF PROGRESSIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION ,NATIONAL ,ECONOMIC ,CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC GROWTH AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR MATERIAL SITUATION . WE ARE SURE THAT THIS PROCESS WILL ALSO BE HELPED BY THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE DIRECTORATE OF THE BA-ATH PARTY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL, SUCH AS THE ORGANISATION OF GENERAL DISCUSSION IN IRAQ OF THE PARTY'S NATIONAL ACTION PLAN AND THE FURTHER REALISATION OF THE STATEMENT OF 11 MARCH 1970 ON THE PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM .'' THE EMPHASIS ON POPULAR DISCUSSION AND THE REFERENCE TO '' OTHER PROGRESSIVE PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS'' PRESUMABLY HAS IN MIND THE PRESENT STRAINED STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IRAQI COMMUNISTS AND THE BA-ATH PARTY . /2. HUSSEIN'S

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2. HUSSEIN'S SPEECH LAID CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND SPECIFICALLY LINKED THIS WITH THE QUESTION OF OIL. " WE HAVE BEEN ABLE SUBSTANTIALLY TO DEVELOP TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN MANY FIELDS ,PARTICULARLY IN THE EXPLOITATION OF THE OIL RESOURCES OF THE COUNTRY BY OUR OWN EFFORTS .THIS PROBLEM HAS PRIME IMPORTANCE FOR THE LIFE OF OUR PEOPLE WHO HAVE DECIDED TO EXERCISE THEEIR LAWFUL RGHTS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MONOPOLIST COMPANIES AND TO GUARANTEE THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT IN THE NATIONAL RICHES. IN THIS WE DEPEND ON OUR STRENGTH , ON THE AID OF OUR FRIENDS AND ABOVE ALL ON THE AID OF THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WE VALUE EXCEPTIONALLY HIGHLY." LATER IN HIS SPEECH HE REFERRED TO " THE PLOTS OF IMPERIALIST ANGLO/AMERICAN CIRCLES AND MONOPOLIST COMPANIES, WHICH ARE CARRYING OUT WIDESPREAD SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST OUR COUNTRY ".

3. HUSSEIN'S SPEECH ENDED WITH A REFERENCE TO " THE FIRM STRATEGIC UNION BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES, PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS " AS THE BASIS FOR THE FURTHER ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ. THIS COULD BE TAKEN AS A REFERENCE TO MILITARY COOPERATION AND MAY BE SIGNIFICANT IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF THE HEADS OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE IN THE IRAQI DELEGATION.

FCO PSE PASS SAVING PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI ,BAHRAIN, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 210 OF 14 FEBRUARY 1972.

M I P T : SADDAN HUSSEIN'S VISIT.

IN THE LIGHT OF FCO CIRCULAR 0255/71 I HAVE THOUGHT IT BEST
TO LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE WHETHER TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE CAN
PROPERLY BE REPEATED TO BAGHDAD.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 135 15 FEBRUARY INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW,
BEIRUT AND KUWAIT. AND SAVING TO PEKING.

YOUR TELEGRAM TO MOSCOW NO 145: VISIT OF HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI
DELEGATION TO MOSCOW.

1. WHEN THE COUNSELLOR SAW THE POLITICAL UNDER SECRETARY IN
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING ON OTHER BUSINESS, HE MENTIONED
THE ENQUIRY BY THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN LONDON AND TOOK ZELLI
THROUGH MOSCOW TELEGRAM CA 209. ZELLI SAID THAT THE IRANIAN
EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD REPORTED SIMILARLY: HE THOUGHT TAKRITI'S
REMARKS QUOTED IN PARA 3 OF MOSCOW TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE
COULD BE IMPORTANT. THE CLOSING COMMUNIQUE (IF THERE WAS ONE)
MIGHT REVEAL MORE.

2. ZELLI REMARKED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE PRAVDA REPORT
OF TAKRITI'S SPEECH OMITTED VARIOUS ANTI-IRANIAN STATEMENTS
WHICH THE LATTER HAD MADE (THE LOCAL PRESS HAS ALSO COMMENTED
ON THIS). THE RUSSIANS WERE THUS AVOIDING GIVING OFFENCE TO IRAN,
JUST AS THE CHINESE HAD RECENTLY DONE WHEN THEY IGNORED SIMILAR
REMARKS BY THEA LEADER OF THE IRAQI DELEGATION IN PEKING.

FCO PASS SAVING TO PEKING.

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
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TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO..228 OF 16TH FEBRUARY 1972.

INFO TO PRIORITY TEHERAN, BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, ALGIERS,
TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

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THE SOVIET PRESS HAS CARRIED REPORTS OF CALLS BY HUSSEIN AND HIS DELEGATION ON PODGORNYY AND BREZHNEV ON 14 AND 15 FEBRUARY RESPECTIVELY. A REPORT HAS ALSO APPEARED OF A CALL BY SAADUNA HAMMADI, IRAQI MINISTER OF OIL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ON SKACHKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMY RELATIONS ON 14 FEBRUARY.

2. ON 12 FEBRUARY THE DELEGATION VISITED THE TAMANSK MOTORISED INFANTRY DIVISION AND WITNESSED SOME TRAINING. FOREIGN MINISTER SAID ABDEL BAKI WAS RECEIVED BY GROMYKO.

3. THE STATEMENT ON HUSSEIN'S CALL ON PODGORNYY REFERS MERELY TO AN EXCHANGE ON QUESTIONS OF SOVIET/IRAQI RELATIONS, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. THE STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER HUSSEIN'S CALL ON BREZHNEV SAYS THAT THE TWO SIDES EXCHANGED OPINIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND EXPRESSED THE COMMON VIEW THAT "THE STRENGTHENING OF AGREEMENT AND UNITY OF ACTION OF THE ARAB STATES AND OF PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN EACH COUNTRY AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WHOLE ARAB WORLD" WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967. BREZHNEV WELCOMED "THE EFFORTS OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE BA-ATH PARTY TO UNIT ALL ANTI-IMPERIALIST PROGRESSIVE FORCES OF THE IRAQI REPUBLIC IN THE STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE COUNTRY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT ON THE PATH OF DEMOCRATISATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS". DURING THE CALL, WHICH /IS

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IS SAID TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE " IN A SINCERE AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE" QUESTIONS "OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BA-ATH PARTY OF IRAQ" WERE ALSO DISCUSSED.

4. THE REFERENCE TO "PROGRESSIVE FORCES" BOTH IN RELATION TO THE ARAB WORLD AND THE IRAQI INTERNAL SITUATION WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE FURTHER THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BA-ATH PARTY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS COME UNDER DISCUSSION DURING THE TALKS (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 209 OF 14 FEBRUARY ON THE KOSYGIN/HUSSEIN EXCHANGE OF SPEECHES). THE RUSSIANS ARE EVIDENTLY PRESSING FOR CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BA-ATH PARTY AND THE COMMUNISTS. BUT IT LOOKS AS IF ONE RESULT OF THE VISIT MAY BE TO ELEVATE THE BA-ATH PARTY IN IRAQ INTO VIRTUALLY A FRATERNAL PARTY ITSELF. KOSYGIN, INCIDENTALLY, REFERRED TO HUSSEIN AS "COMRADE".

5. THE STATEMENT ON HAMMADI'S CALL ON SKACHKOV DESCRIBED THE CALL AS A DISCUSSION OF "SOVIET/IRAQI ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION".

6. ARAB AMBASSADORS HERE ARE DESCRIBING THIS VISIT AS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THIS IS CERTAINLY BORNE OUT BY THE HIGH LEVEL TREATMENT THE DELEGATION IS RECEIVING AND THE RANGE OF ITS INTERESTS.

PLEASE REPEAT IF APPROPRIATE TO BAGHDAD.

F.C.O. PASS SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

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TO IMMEDIATE F.C.O. TELNO...231 OF 17TH FEBRUARY 1972.

INFO TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD, TEHRAN, BEIRUT AND KUWAIT.

SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI
AND WASHINGTON.

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

THIS MORNING'S PRAVDA REPORTS THAT TALKS BETWEEN SOVIET

LEADERS AND THE IRAQI PARTY AND GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ENDED
IN THE KREMLIN ON 16 FEBRUARY. THE TALKS ARE SAID TO HAVE TAKEN
PLACE IN A "WARM AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE" AND CONFIRMED
"FULL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED THAT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE
PUBLISHED ON THE TALKS". (THIS HAS NOT YET APPEARED).

2. THIS MORNING'S PRAVDA ALSO REPORTS THAT HUSSEIN GIVE A

DINNER ON 16 FEBRUARY AT WHICH THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE OF SPEECHES
WITH KOSYGIN. THE SPEECHES, ARE NOT PUBLISHED.

F.C.O. PASS SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN,
ALGIERS, TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

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
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TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO...237 OF 18TH FEBRUARY 1972.

INFO TO PRIORITY TEHRAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT,

SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI
AND WASHINGTON.

SOVIET UNION/IRAQ.

THIS MORNING'S PRAVDA CARRIES THE TEXT OF THE JOINT
COMMUNIQUE ON THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF THE IRAQI
PARTY/GOVERNMENT DELEGATION FROM 10-17 FEBRUARY. THE FOLLOWING
IS A SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS.

IRAQI INTERNAL.

2. THE IRAQI SIDE INFORMED THE SOVIET SIDE OF MEASURES TAKEN
BY THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT " TOWARDS A PEACEFUL DEMOCRATIC
SOLUTION OF THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT
OF 11 MARCH 1970 AND TOWARDS THE UNITING OF ALL NATIONAL
PATRIOTIC PROGRESSIVE FORCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL
FRONT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF NATIONAL ACTION ".

OIL.

3. THE TWO SIDES CONFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO STRENGTHEN
FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
" PARTICULARLY IN THE FIELD OF THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
SOVIET/IRAQI POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY COOPERATION AND
IN THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY OF IRAQ. THE SOVIET
SIDE EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT
IN THE OIL SPHERE IN THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE
AND ALSO FOR THE FIRM POSITION TAKEN BY THE BA-ATH PARTY AND
THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THE MONOPOLISTIC OIL
COMPANIES. THE IRAQI SIDE IN TURN EXPRESSED ITS GRATITUDE FOR
THE GREAT AND SELFLESS AID WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAD OFFERED, /AND

AND WAS CONTINUING TO OFFER IRAQ IN ORDER THAT SHE SHOULD BE ABLE TO CREATE A NATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY AND EXPLOIT INDEPENDENTLY HER OIL RESOURCES SO AS TO STRENGTHEN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ''.

PARTY/STATE RELATIONS.

4. THE TWO SIDES EXPRESSED '' SATISFACTION WITH THE STATE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS '' BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BA-ATH PARTY AND EXPRESSED THEIR MUTUAL DETERMINATION TO FURTHER DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONS '' IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE IRAQI REPUBLIC. '' WITH REGARD TO INTER-STATE RELATIONS THE TWO SIDES COMMITTED THEMSELVES '' TO STUDY FURTHER MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A CORRESPONDING STRENGTHENING OF THE RELATIONS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO STATES AND RAISE THEM TO A NEW HIGHER LEVEL EXPRESSED IN THE FORM OF A TREATY. ''

MIDDLE EAST.

5. THE TWO SIDES CONDEMNED ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN STANDARD TERMS AND CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM ALL OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS. THE IRAQI SIDE EXPRESSED ITS APPRECIATION FOR THE DETERMINATION WITH WHICH THE SOVIET UNION PURSUED ITS POLICY AIMED AT ACHIEVING A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WAS NOTED THAT '' THE UNITY OF ACTION OF THE ARAB STATES, THE MOBILISATION OF THEIR FORCES AND POTENTIAL IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PLOTS OF THE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM AND REACTION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THEIR COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES'''' WAS A PRIME CONDITION FOR SUCCESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE TWO SIDES CONDEMNED THE ATTEMPTS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM TO SPREAD '' ANTI-COMMUNISM AND ANTI-SOVIETISM '' IN THE ARAB WORLD.

PERSIAN GULF.

6. THE TWO SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA AND CALLED FOR THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.

/OTHER SUBJECTS

OTHER SUBJECTS.

7. THE SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND CALLED FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION THROUGH THE STRICT ADHERENCE OF MEMBER STATES TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LAWS. APPROVAL WAS EXPRESSED OF THE PRAGUE COMMUNIQUE OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, U S AGGRESSION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA WAS CONDEMNED IN STANDARD TERMS.

INVITATIONS.

8. HUSSEIN EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY AND KOSYGIN TO PAY OFFICIAL VISITS TO IRAQ AT A TIME TO BE DECIDED LATER.

9. THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE DESCRIBED THE TALKS AS TAKING PLACE ' ' IN A FRIENDLY, COMRADELY ATMOSPHERE ' '.

10. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY MONDAY'S BAG.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 241 OF 18 FEBRUARY 1972.
INFO/TO TEHRAN BEIRUT KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD.
SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN, ALGIERS, TRIPOLI
AND WASHINGTON.

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- SOVIET UNION/IRAQ. MY TELEGRAM NO 237 OF 18 FEBRUARY.

THE OBVIOUS POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE COMMUNIQUE ARE THE
COMBINED COMMITMENT TO WORK TOWARDS A SOVIET/IRAQI TREATY AND
THE COMMITMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE BOTH MATERIAL AND MORAL
SUPPORT TO THE IRAQIS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN " INDEPENDENT "
IRAQI OIL INDUSTRY.

2. THESE TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN THEMSELVES REPRESENT A CONSIDERABLE
STEP FORWARD IN COMPARISON WITH THE STATE OF RELATIONS REFLECTED
IN THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON 13 AUGUST 1970 AFTER HUSSEIN'S LAST
VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION. AT THAT TIME THE TWO SIDES WENT NO
FURTHER THAN AGREEING " TO CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE TALKS WITH
THE AIM OF ARRIVING AT AGREEMENTS ON A NUMBER OF CONCRETE
QUESTIONS OF SOVIET /IRAQI CO-OPERATION IN DIFFERENT FIELDS. "

3. AT THE SAME TIME THE COMMUNIQUE DOES NOT QUITE ADD UP
TO THE " FIRM STRATEGIC UNION BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES PARTIES
AND GOVERNMENTS " OF WHICH HUSSEIN SPOKE IN HIS SPEECH REPORTED
IN MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO 209 OF 14 FEBRUARY. THIS IS PRESUMABLY
ENVISAGED FOR THE FORMAL TREATY NOW TO BE NEGOTIATED.

4. THERE ARE VARIOUS SIGNS FROM THE COMMUNIQUE THAT DISCUSSION
OF THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQI
COMMUNISTS AND THE BA-ATH PARTY PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE
DISCUSSIONS. THE STATEMENT OF THE IRAQI SIDE ON THE KURDISH
PROBLEM AND THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE BA-ATH PARTY AND THE
GOVERNMENT " TOWARDS THE UNITY OF ALL NATIONAL PATRIOTIC AND
PROGRESSIVE FORCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NATIONAL FRONT "
APPEARS IN THE COMMUNIQUE BEFORE THE SECTION DEVOTED TO /BILATERAL

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BILATERAL RELATIONS. SIMILARLY THE EXPRESSION OF " SATISFACTION " WITH THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BA-ATH PARTY CONTRASTS WITH THE RATHER FULLER DESCRIPTION OF THE INTER-STATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE SOVIET UNION.

5. NONETHELESS THE COMMUNIQUE AS A WHOLE SHOWS A FAR CLOSER IDENTITY OF VIEWS ON THE QUESTIONS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS THAN DID THE COMMUNIQUE OF 13 APRIL 1970 WHERE THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS WAS DESCRIBED AT FAR GREATER LENGTH THAN DISCUSSION OF SOVIET/IRAQI RELATIONS. IF ONE ASSUMES THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF HUSSEIN'S VISIT WAS TO SECURE SOVIET ASSISTANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI OIL INDUSTRY HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL THOUGH THE COST OF ACHIEVING THIS ASSISTANCE MAY HAVE BEEN A COMMITMENT TO CLOSER CO-OPERATION WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY. ON ARMS THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINS NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENT . HOWEVER, THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE TALKS INCLUDED GENERAL S.L. SOKOLOV WHO IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENCE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS SUPPLIES QUESTIONS.

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18 February 1972

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Saddam Husayn's Luncheon for Aleksey Kosygin

Baghdad home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 16.2.72

Text of report:

Comrade Saddam Husayn, Deputy Regional Secretary of the Ba'th Party and Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council, gave a luncheon today in Moscow in honour of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and CPSU Politburo member, Aleksey Kosygin. The luncheon held in the reception house in the Lenin Hills in Moscow was attended by senior Soviet government and party officials including: Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and CPSU Politburo member, Polyanskiy; Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ilyashenko; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Dymshits; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Novikov; the Foreign Minister, Gromyko; members of the Soviet negotiating delegation, a number of Soviet civilian and military personalities and members of the Iraqi delegation and staff of the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow.

On his arrival, Aleksey Kosygin was welcomed by Comrade Saddam Husayn. The two then held a 30-minute closed meeting. They later proceeded to the dining table with the other guests. Comrades Husayn and Kosygin exchanged speeches.

In his speech, Comrade Saddam Husayn greeted the Soviet leaders, Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin, the Soviet negotiating delegation and the CPSU. He called for the strengthening of Arab-Soviet and Soviet-Iraqi friendship.

In his reply, Comrade Kosygin expressed his profound gratitude to the Iraqi delegation. Addressing Comrade Saddam Husayn, he said: We are confident that your visit to the Soviet Union at the head of a government and party delegation is a step which strengthens the relations between the two countries. This visit will open a new chapter in the permanent relations between the two countries. Comrade Kosygin greeted the President of the Republic, F-M Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Comrade Saddam Husayn and members of his delegation. He also greeted the Iraqi and Arab peoples, the common struggle of the Arab countries, and the socialist organization.

The Iraqi News Agency correspondent with the party and government delegation reports that Revolution Command Council member and Foreign Minister, Comrade Murtada Sa'id Abd al-Baqi, has invited the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrey Gromyko, to visit Iraq. The invitation has been accepted and the date of the visit will be fixed later.

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ME/3918/A/13

18 February 1972

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Saddam Husayn's Luncheon for Aleksey Kosygin

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Text of report:

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The Iraqi News Agency carried the following report at 10.30 GMT on 12th February: "Moscow: The CPSU Secretary General, Leonid Brezhnev; the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Aleksey Kosygin; and the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Nikolay Podgornyy, have accepted an invitation to visit Iraq. The Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council and Deputy Secretary of the Ba'th Party, Saddam Husayn, invited the Soviet leaders to attend the celebrations marking the start of oil production at Rumaylah oilfield in April."

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22 FEB 1972

Cutting dated 19

Russia may sign friendship pact with Iraq

MOSCOW, Monday.—Western diplomats here believe the Soviet Union is trying to arrange a friendship treaty with Iraq along the lines of those signed last year with Egypt and India.

In the wake of a visit by a high-level Iraqi delegation, who were given an extremely warm welcome by the Kremlin last week, Western observers see evidence that Moscow has won agreement from the Baathist regime in Iraq to legalise the long-suppressed Communist Party there and to include them in a new national coalition.

Both moves would mark a breakthrough for the Russians in their see-saw relations with Iraq, bolstering their influence in the Middle East at a time of increasing competition with China.

The Communist Party organ, "Pravda," today hailed the "fruitful results" of the Iraqi-Soviet meetings between February 10 and 17, and said that the efforts in Iraq of the ruling

Baath Party "to unite all anti-imperialist and progressive forces, including Communists and Kurdish democrats," would undoubtedly promote Iraqi independence and social development.

Many diplomatic observers were struck by the fact that the Iraqi delegation, headed by Vice-President Takriti, who is regarded as the real power behind the Leftist regime, was received even more warmly than President Sadat of Egypt, who also visited Moscow recently.

A joint communique, published last Thursday, not only pledged more Soviet aid for developing Iraq's national oil industry and her armed forces, but also declared that the two sides had agreed to study additional measures to consolidate their relations and "elevate them to a new, higher level within the framework of a treaty."

It was this last phrase that gave rise to diplomatic surmises that the Kremlin were successfully pressing the Iraqi leadership to enter into a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

The "World Marxist Review," a leading Communist theoretical journal published in Prague but generally considered to reflect Moscow's line, carried in December the report of an interview with a leading Communist from Ceylon describing friendship treaties, such as the one signed by the Soviet Union and India, as an important element of the Russian concept of collective security in Asia. — New York Times News Service.

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DEFENCE TALKS

Cairo: Egypt and the Soviet Union today expressed satisfaction at the growing military co-operation between them.

A joint communique issued at the end of a four-day visit here by the Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, said also that the two countries had exchanged views on increasing Egypt's fighting capabilities.

An atmosphere of mutual friendship and understanding had prevailed during the talks, the communique said.

During his visit Marshal Grechko had visited some Egyptian military units and expressed his satisfaction at the standard of training and the Egyptian forces' fighting skill, the communique added.—Reuter.

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To: Miss V. Beckett.

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22 FEB 1972

NEQ 3/303/1

A10 SYRIAN-SOVIET PARTIES SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT (WITH B33)

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(DAMASCUS RADIO) A COOPERATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SYRIAN ARAB SOCIALIST BAAATH PARTY AND THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY WAS SIGNED AT THE BAAATH PARTY NATIONAL COMMAND'S HEADQUARTERS THIS AFTERNOON. ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE BAAATH PARTY ABDALLAH AL-AHMAR AND KIRILL MAZUROV, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SIGNED THE AGREEMENT.

IN A SPEECH ABDALLAH AL-AHMAR SAID THE AGREEMENT CONTAINS A PROGRAMME OF WORK FOR BENEFITING FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF THE TWO PARTIES. IT WILL SERVE IN DEVELOPING THE EXISTING FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO PARTIES AND COUNTRIES.

MF BBC MON 1759 22/2 JMA

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KIRILL MAZUROV, EXPRESSING HOPE THAT THE AGREEMENT BECOMES A NEW STEP ON THE ROAD OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, SAID IT WILL STRENGTHEN THE ABILITIES OF THE TWO PARTIES IN FACING ALL IMPERIALIST PLOTS.

END BBC MON 1800 22/2 JMA (KY)

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 159 OF 24 FEBRUARY INFO ROUTINE
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ALGIERS, TRIPOLI AND WASHINGTON.

13

MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO. 241 OF 18 FEBRUARY:

SOVIET UNION/IRAQ.

1. WHEN I WAS SEEING THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 21 FEBRUARY ON OTHER MATTERS, HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD VIEWS ON THE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING THE VISIT OF THE IRAQI DELEGATION TO THE SOVIET UNION (MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO. 237). I GAVE HIM — ⁽²⁾ THE GIST OF TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AS REPRESENTING THE VIEWS OF OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.
2. KHALATBARI WAS INTERESTED BUT SURPRISED THAT I HAD NOT COMMENTED ON THE COMMUNIQUE'S PASSAGE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS WAS, TO HIS MIND, MOST SIGNIFICANT. FOR THE FIRST TIME (HE BELIEVED), THE RUSSIANS HAD SUPPORTED, IN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE "THE UNITY OF ACTION OF THE ARAB STATES..... IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PLOTS OF THE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM AND REACTION....., AS A PRIME CONDITON FOR SUCCESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAELI AGGRESSION." WAS THIS NOT A NEW DEVELOPMENT ? IT HAD BEEN NORMAL RUSSIAN POLICY TO DEAL WITH EACH ARAB COUNTRY SEPARATELY. WERE THEY NOW TRYING TO PRESENT THE ARAB STATES AS A UNITED FORCE, BACKED BY SOVIET STRENGTH ? IN THE CONTEXT OF A SOVIET/IRAQI

/COMMUNIQUE,

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COMMUNIQUE, THE "FORCES OF IMPERIALISM" WERE CLEARLY MEANT TO INCLUDE THE IRANIANS. HE FEARED THIS WAS AN INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD TRY TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE, NOT ONLY IN IRAQ, BUT IN, E.G., EGYPT TOO, ENCOURAGING THE ARABS TO CONCERT THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST WESTERN AND ALLIED INTERESTS.

3. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS WAS PERHAPS READING TOO MUCH INTO THIS PASSAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE. MORE SIGNIFICANT, TO MY MIND, WAS THE SUGGESTION OF A FORMAL TREATY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAQ. IT HAD BEEN REPORTED THAT GROMYKO WOULD BE VISITING IRAQ IN APRIL. THIS MIGHT BE THE OCCASION FOR THE SIGNATURE OF SUCH A TREATY.

4. KHALATBARI SAID THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD ASSURED HIM THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD STERNLY REFUSED TO ALLOW THE IRAQI DELEGATION TO EXPRESS STATEMENTS HOSTILE TO IRAN. BUT KHALATBARI DID NOT DERIVE MUCH COMFORT FROM THIS. A SOVIET/IRAQI TREATY COULD NOT BUT BE REGARDED WITH CONCERN AS BEING OPEN TO ABUSE BY IRAQ AND AGAINST IRAN'S INTERESTS.

5. KHALATBARI ALSO TOLD ME THAT THE PURCHASE OF DEEP-SEA FISHING VESSELS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BASE FOR THEM NEAR BASRA (ARBUTHNOTT'S LETTER OF 24 FEBRUARY TO N.E.D.) HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH THE IRAQI DELEGATION IN MOSCOW. AGAIN, IRAN WAS BOUND TO SUSPECT THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE A CAMOUFLAGE FOR SOVIET FLEET FACILITIES IN THE GULF.

6. THE IRANIANS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY WORRIED ABOUT THE SOVIET PENETRATION OF IRAQ. THEY MAY WELL THINK WE HAVE BEEN TOO COMPLACENT ABOUT THIS IN THE EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD ON THE SUBJECT OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, CERTAINLY THE SHAH'S FORECASTS HAVE PROVED TO BE NEAR THE MARK. HE WILL NOW WISH TO CONTINUE THESE EXCHANGES EVEN MORE CLOSELY. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME HAVE A FULL BRIEF WHICH WOULD ENABLE ME TO GIVE THE SHAH OUR UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT WHEN I SEE HIM AFTER HIS RETURN (I HAVE A PROVISIONAL AUDIENCE ON 8 MARCH).
RAMSBOTHAM. [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]


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Royal Swedish Embassy
British Interests
Section,
Baghdad.

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Miss V.E. Beckett,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.



26 February, 1972.

Dear Monica

Saddam Hussein's Visit to Moscow

There was nothing remarkable in the Press after Saddam's return from Moscow except for an editorial in "al-Ta'akhi" which expressed disappointment that no representative of the KDP was included in the delegation contrary to what had happened during the negotiations with IPC.

*Comma
/an*

D.I. Lewty

c.c. Chanceries in Moscow,
Peking,
Beirut,
Teheran,
Kuwait.

*Ms
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BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

25 February 1972

3/7

Miss V Beckett
Near Eastern Department
Foreign & Commonwealth Office

See 20
p 8
14

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Dear Miss Beckett

SADDAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. We have reported in Moscow telegrams nos. 209, 228, 237 and 241 (not to all) the details of the visit which have appeared in the Soviet press and our comments on the joint Soviet-Iraqi communique. The English language version of the communique did not unfortunately appear in time for inclusion in last Monday's unclassified bag and I therefore enclose a copy with this letter.

2. First, on the communique, two additional comments suggest themselves on further study of the text. The first concerns the passage on the Middle East which states that "the sides consider that a just and secure peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the liberation of all Arab territories occupied as a result of the imperialist aggression of Israel and the guaranteeing of the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine". There is no mention here of either Security Council Resolution 242 or of 1967 as the date for Israeli occupation of Arab territories. This suggests that the Russians were unsuccessful in persuading the Iraqis to adopt their less extreme view of the time-scale of Israeli aggression and may in turn explain the inclusion later in the communique of the passage in which the sides "confirmed their adherence to the principles of the United Nations Organisation" as "an important instrument of peace and security". This is not a common Soviet communique topic and it occurs to us that it may have been included by the Russians in place of a reference to the UN role in the context of the Middle East. Nonetheless, the Middle East passage does represent a considerable advance over the "exchange of opinions on the Middle East situation" recorded in the communique of 13 August 1970 after Hussein's last visit here.

3. On arms we reported in Moscow telegram no. 241 that the communique contained no specific commitment. The subject was referred to only once in the context of "the further development of Soviet-Iraqi political, economic and military cooperation and the creation of

/and Iraqi

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an Iraqi national oil industry". We are however inclined not to read too much into the cautious tone of the communique bearing in mind the already established level of Soviet assistance to the Iraqi armed forces and Grechko's visit at the end of last year during which one assumes the principal discussions on this topic took place. It is interesting to note that General Sokolov who sat in on the talks with Saddam Hussein's delegation and accompanied the delegation on its visit to the Tamansk motorised infantry division has now left with Mazurov on the Soviet Government and Party delegation to Syria.

4. As we suggested in our telegram No. 237 the commitment in the joint communique of the two sides to work towards a Soviet-Iraqi Treaty and the Soviet commitment to give both material and moral support to the Iraqis in the development of their national oil industry are clearly the most significant results of the visit. We are not in a position here to judge to what extent this new Soviet commitment on oil is likely to jeopardise Western interests any more than earlier examples of Soviet involvement in the Iraqi oil industry (for example the Iraqi-Soviet agreement of 7 January for the supply of Russian equipment for the oil industry referred to in Tehran telegram no. 26 of 10 January). But, read in conjunction with the extract from Petrov's article in Izvestia reported in our telegram no. 274 of 25 February, this is undoubtedly the most unequivocal expression of Soviet support for the Iraqi struggle against the Western oil companies which we have seen up to now. The joint commitment to work towards a Soviet/Iraqi Treaty has attracted a good deal of attention here and has given rise to speculation about whether the initiative on this came in the first place from the Soviet or from the Iraqi side. The general opinion is that the initiative must have been a Soviet one although no doubt the Iraqis have been pressing for closer links with the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to oil development, for some time. It is unusual for the Russians to refer publicly to plans for such a treaty before it has been concluded, and it is possible that the Russians tried to get the Iraqis to sign a treaty during the visit but that some disagreement about the wording or about specific commitments prevented this. There have also been signs lately that the Russians have been making positive efforts to mend fences with the Ba-ath Party over the question of the Kurds and the local communist party, which were until not too long ago a source of friction which the Russians seemed content to maintain. As recently as November last year the Soviet press was reporting that the implementation of the March 1970 agreement on the Kurdish problem was "running into difficulties, that certain articles are being

/implemented

NEQ 1/3 (45) —

implemented slowly, that others still await resolution" and that there was "no unity in the country between the basic political forces which composed the progressive platform - the ruling Ba-ath Party, the KDR and the Communist Party" (see Nick Livingston's letter 3/120 of 11 November 1971). In contrast articles on the same topic in Izvestia and Komsomolskaya Pravda on 9 and 10 February have taken the line that the Charter of National Action of the Ba-ath Party has already gone a considerable way towards overcoming the formal inter-party rivalries and that the proposals contained in the statement of March 1970 have provided a successful solution to the problem of Arab-Kurdish relations. The wording of the relevant section in the joint communique and Kosygin's reference to Iraqi internal situation in his speech on 11 February, though cautious, do nonetheless indicate a more conciliatory attitude towards the Ba-ath Party than we have seen hitherto. Seen against the background of closer military ties reflected in the communique on Grechko's visit last December, and of the agreement on the supply of oil equipment, these moves do seem to add up to a deliberate decision by the Soviet Union to seek a closer relationship with the Iraqis.

5. Why this should be so is not immediately obvious, though we tend to share the view held by the American Embassy here that the visit may well be a first step in Soviet efforts to widen their sphere of influence in the Arab world as an insurance against a possible souring of their relationship with the Egyptians or alternatively as a check to growing Arab hostility towards Soviet conduct of the Middle East dispute. It is certainly significant that the Soviet Union should at this stage be contemplating a treaty relationship with a second Arab country, thereby detracting from the special nature of her relationship with the Egyptians, and that she should choose to do so with the Iraqis whose position on the Palestine question has traditionally differed from that of her Arab neighbours. It is also a sign of the importance which the Soviets attach to relations with the Iraqis that they should be prepared to run the risk of damaging their relationship with the Shah which, one assumes, a treaty association with the Iraq regime is bound to do. We wondered, in fact, if the tentative way in which the references to a Treaty was phrased might not have been due to sensitivity over the possible Iranian reaction (see paragraph 7 below).

6. If this assessment of the situation is correct the current visit of a Soviet government and party delegation to Syria may yield interesting results. It must be more than coincidental that a Soviet delegation should be

/visiting

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visiting a second Ba-athist state so soon after the Iraqi visit, particularly since the press here has been highlighting the close state of relations between the CPSU and the Syrian Ba-athist Party and the success of the local Ba-ath Party in forming a national front uniting all progressive forces including the communists. The similarity between such remarks and those which appeared during the Iraqi visit leads one to speculate whether the Russians do not have in mind formulating some similar close relationship with the Syrian Party.

7. The visit of a Libyan delegation led by Major Jalud hard on the heels of the Iraqis suggests that the Russians are embarking on a more active and diversified Middle Eastern policy than for some time. It is not yet clear what the lines of this policy will be, but there is some evidence that one element will be active support for those Arab regimes which are in a position to damage Western economic interests by their policy on oil. I hope we shall have more to say on this when we see the results of Mazurov's visit to Syria and Jalud's visit here. Finally, I think it is worth recording that there have been several indications in the last few days of Russian sensitivity about the publicity which their commitment in the joint communique to work towards a Soviet-Iraqi Treaty may receive elsewhere. You will notice that the wording of the relevant section of the communique itself is studiously cautious. Tass in English did not, as they usually do, publish a full text of the communique and its summary omitted all reference to the idea of a treaty. The results of the visit have been covered in commentary columns in Izvestia and Pravda and the Pravda weekly international round-up, of which only the Izvestia column (which appeared first) mentioned the intention to heighten relations to a treaty level. Whilst it would be wrong to make too much of these points, they do nonetheless suggest that the Soviets prefer not to draw too much attention to this aspect of the communique before they have had a chance to test international reaction. So far as we can see from here this aspect of the Iraqi visit does not appear to have caused much of a stir in the West.

*Yours sincerely
Michael Robinson*

M J Robinsons

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Friday, February 18, 1972

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JOINT SOVIET-IRACI COMMUNIQUE

An Iraqi Party and Government delegation, headed by Saddam Hussein, Deputy General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) of Iraq and Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of the Republic of Iraq, stayed in the Soviet Union from the 10th to the 17th of February, 1972, on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government.

Saddam Hussein was received by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and N.V. Podgorny, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Talks took place between Saddam Hussein and A.N. Kosygin, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

In the course of the talks, which proceeded in a friendly, comradely atmosphere, major issues on the state and the further development of Soviet-Iraqi relations and inter-Party ties, and also pressing international problems came under discussion.

Other participants in the talks were:

From the Soviet Side--B.N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.N. Novikov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee and Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; A.A. Gromyko, Member of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; S.A. Skachkov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Relations Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers; Army General S.L. Sokolov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee and First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR; V.A. Likhachev, USSR Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, and M.D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR;

from the Iraqi Side--Mortada Said Abdel Baqi, Member of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath) of Iraq, Member of the Council of the Revolutionary Command and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Muhammed Fadel, Member of the Regional Leadership of the Baath Party and Member of the Bureau of the Council of the Revolutionary Command on General Issues; Dr. Saadoun Hamadi, Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources; Salih Mehdi Amash, Ambassador of the Republic of Iraq to the USSR; Dr. Fakhri Kadouri, Member

Friday, February 18, 1972

- 2 -

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of the Bureau of the Council of the Revolutionary Command on Economic Issues; Shadel Taqa, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; Lieutenant General Abdel Jabbar Shanshal, Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, and Brigadier Hussein Khayavi, Commander of the Air Force.

The Soviet Side informed the Iraqi delegation about the successes scored by the Soviet people in the implementation of the decisions of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the building of communism, and about the foreign-policy action of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government aimed at consolidating universal peace and the security of nations.

In turn, the Iraqi Side informed the Soviet Side about the accomplishments of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and the Iraqi Government in progressive socio-economic transformations and the upbuilding of an independent national economy as well as in the matter of strengthening national unity and the measures being taken for a peaceful, democratic solution of the Kurd problem in keeping with the statement of March 11, 1970, and for the uniting of all national patriotic, progressive forces within the framework of a National Front in conformity with the Charter of National Action. The Iraqi Side likewise informed the Soviet Side about the anti-imperialist policy which the Iraqi leadership is promoting in foreign affairs.

The Sides have noted with satisfaction that the friendly relations and broad cooperation of the two countries have been successfully developing and growing stronger. They have expressed their firm conviction that the steady development of these relations is in the interests of the Soviet and Iraqi peoples, in the interests of the common struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism. The Sides confirmed their aspiration to promote the relations of friendship and versatile cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq, especially in the sphere of further developing Soviet-Iraqi political, economic and military cooperation and in building up Iraq's national petroleum industry.

The Soviet Side has expressed its support of the policy which the Iraqi Government pursues in the sphere of petroleum in the national interests of the Iraqi people, as well as of the resolute stand taken by the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and the Iraqi Government towards monopolistic petroleum companies.

The Iraqi Side, in its turn, has highly appreciated the extensive selfless aid which the friendly Soviet Union has been rendering Iraq to give it the possibility of building up a national petroleum industry and of independently operating its petroleum resources in order to strengthen its national economy.

The Sides expressed their satisfaction with the state of friendly relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and voiced their reciprocal aspiration to further developing these relations in the interests of promoting friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq, their joint struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, for peace, democracy and social progress.

Guided by the mutual aspiration to steadily develop and consolidate relations of friendship and all-round cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Iraq, the Sides have agreed to study, with due account of the present exchange of views, the additional measures that might be undertaken in the nearest future for adequately consolidating the relations established between the two states, for elevating them on a new, higher level and formulating this in a respective treaty.

A great deal of attention in the course of the talks was paid to the present situation in the Middle East. The Sides have stated that, due to continued Israeli imperialist aggression against the Arab countries, the situation in this area remains tense and is a menace to peace. This is the result of the political, military, financial and economic assistance rendered to the aggressor by the imperialist circles of the USA and by international Zionism, which, as before, strive to undermine progressive Arab regimes, retain their position on the Arab East, and continue to plunder the petroleum resources of this area.

The Sides consider that no just and durable peace can be established in the Middle East without the liberation of all Arab territories occupied as a result of Israel's imperialist aggression and without guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.. They have expressed their support of the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine for the rehabilitation of their legitimate rights.

The Soviet Side has declared that the Soviet Union is prepared to go on rendering versatile assistance and support to the righteous struggle of Arab peoples against imperialism, Zionism and reaction, for the consolidation of their national independence and social progress, for establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Iraqi Side highly assessed the unfailing efforts of the Soviet Union in this direction. It expresses its gratitude for the valuable assistance the Soviet Union is rendering Iraq and the other Arab states, as well as the unselfish and sincere position of the Soviet Union in relation to the Arab peoples who are fighting for freedom, peace and social progress.

It was pointed out in the course of the talks that the united actions of the Arab states, the mobilisation of their efforts and possibilities in the struggle against the intrigues of the forces of imperialism and reaction, and the strengthening of their cooperation with the socialist countries constitute a major condition for success of the struggle against the imperialist Israeli aggression.

In this connection the Sides vigorously condemned the attempts of international imperialism to spread anti-communism and anti-Sovietism calculated on violating the solidarity of the Arab countries and peoples and their cooperation with the true friends--the socialist countries.

The Sides vigorously condemned the attempts of imperialism to spread hostility against the Republic of Iraq and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, and against the unity of the Arab countries on the anti-imperialist basis for the purpose of restoring imperialist influence in this area and weakening the Arab liberation movement, and because of their anti-imperialist foreign policy and the successes they achieved in carrying out progressive social and economic transformations.

The Sides expressed full support of the struggle of the Arab states and peoples of the area of the Persian Gulf for the right to determine their destiny, for the abolition of imperialist domination and all foreign military bases, against colonialism, and condemn the intrigues and conspiracies of imperialism in this area.

The Sides discussed urgent international problems pertaining to strengthening universal peace and security, and noted the proximity or identity of positions on these questions. The unanimous opinion was voiced on the importance of stepping up the struggle of the peace-loving forces for consolidating peace and international security. The Sides expressed themselves in favour of the fulfilment of the resolution of the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly on the convocation of a world disarmament conference.

The Iraqi delegation highly appraised the decisions of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries recently held in Prague and regards them a major contribution towards strengthening peace in Europe which has tremendous importance for safeguarding international security as a whole.

Regarding the United Nations Organisation as an important instrument of peace and security, the Sides confirmed their fidelity to the principles of this Organisation and came out for the need strictly to observe its Charter, standards of international law, and international treaties and agreements.

The Sides expressed their serious concern over the dangerous tension which remains in South-East Asia in consequence of the continued American aggression. They resolutely condemned the imperialist aggression of the United States against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as well as the resumption of the barbarous bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Sides declared that, in their firm belief, a realistic and constructive foundation for an effective settlement of the Vietnam problem is provided by the 7-point proposals which were endorsed once again in the statement made by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam on February 2, this year.

The Sides declared their solidarity with the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America which wage a just struggle against imperialism, for national independence and social progress, and reaffirmed the resolution to work for the final abolition of colonialism.

The Sides consider that the visit to the USSR of the Iraqi Party and Government Delegation made another major contribution to the further development of the relations of friendship and comprehensive cooperation which connect the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic.

On behalf of Ahmed Hassan el-Bahr, President of the Iraqi Republic and General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Party of Arab Socialist Renaissance, Saddam Hussein invited Comrades L.I. Brezhnev, N.V. Podgorny and A.N. Kosygin to come on official friendly visits to Iraq. The invitations were accepted with gratitude. The time of the visits will be determined later.

* * *

The delegation of the Iraqi Republic, led by Saddam Hussein, Deputy General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Party of Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baath) of Iraq, Vice-Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of the Iraqi Republic, left for home on February 17.

* * *

From his plane Saddam Hussein sent a telegramme to A.N. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, which reads as follows:

"Leaving your friendly country, I want to express once again my sincere thanks and gratitude for the hospitality my comrades and I were accorded in the Soviet Union. We shall for long retain the best recollections of the talks we had with Comrades L.I. Brezhnev, N.V. Podgorny and You.

We are confident that friendship and cooperation between our two countries and peoples will continue to develop in the interests of attaining the aims of our common struggle."

(Pravda, February 18. Slightly
abridged.)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01- 930 8440 Ext 310

M J Robinson Esq
British Embassy
MOSCOW

Your reference

Our reference

Date 1 March 1972

1. Thank you for your extremely interesting letter of 25 February about Saddam Hussein's visit, and for your telegram No. 296. Both ⁽¹⁹⁾ NED and ourselves were most appreciative of these timely reports, which the Assessment Staff were able to draw on in preparing the pieces on recent visits which you will be receiving shortly. We have also incorporated some of your ideas in a piece on Soviet activity in the Middle East for the current issue of "Communist Policy and Tactics". We should be interested in any further thoughts that occur to you, since we may find ourselves writing quite a number of assessments of Soviet Policy in the Middle East if the present active phase continues. ^{NES 3/30/72} X

C Hulse
Eastern European & Soviet Dept

Copy to: Miss Beckett
Near Eastern Dept

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Reference

Enter

Miss Sachett

Wear button left, F/C.O.

I return the attached letter.

2. I do not think I should yet want to change my view that, on the scanty evidence available, the Treaty idea is more likely to have been an Iraqi than a Soviet initiative. The evidence at the end of para. 7 of this letter might be held to strengthen that view.

3. On the other hand I should not be particularly surprised if I was shown to be wrong later.

A. J. Cohen $\frac{29}{2}$

Mr Smyth

CCSD - Mr Hyke

Research Dept ^{CR 6/11}

Oil Dept

Mr Fullerton

11/3
29/12


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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 305 OF 2 MARCH 1972.
INFO PRIORITY TO CAIRO , BEIRUT, TRIPOLI , BAGHDAD
AND TEHRAN, ROUTINE TO KUWAIT, BENGHAZI, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NEW YORK
AND PARIS.

SOVIET UNION/IRAQ.

THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAS TOLD THE GERMAN EMBASSY HERE
THAT THE TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION REFERRED TO IN THE COMMUNIQUE
ON THE RECENT IRAQI VISIT IS NOW UNDER PREPARATION AND RECEIVING
ITS FINAL TOUCHES. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT HE
EXPECTED IT TO BE SIGNED IN BAGHDAD IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE.

NAD 2. THIS MAY TIE IN WITH NEWSPAPER REPORTS IN THE BAGHDAD AND
TRIPOLI PRESS (BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 125 OF 14 FEB AND TRIPOLI TEL-
-GRAM NO 316 OF 27 FEBRUARY) THAT A HIGH LEVEL SOVIET
DELEGATION IS EXPECTED TO VISIT IRAQ IN APRIL FOR THE INAUGURATION
OF THE NEW NORTH RUMAILIA OIL FIELD.

DOBBS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 180 OF 02 MARCH INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW,
BEIRUT, KUWAIT AND CAIRO.

SAVING TO PEKING, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON.

MYTEL NO. 159: SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. I WAS ASKED TO CALL YESTERDAY BY THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, IN KHALATBARI'S ABSENCE. MIRFENDEREWski SAID THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WERE BECOMING CONCERNED AT THE SIGNS OF EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD, HERALDING PERHAPS SOME NEW SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PERSIAN GULF. HE INSTANCED THE VISIT TO SYRIA OF THE SOVIET PARTY/GOVERNMENT DELEGATION AND THE PASSAGES IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNITED ARAB ACTION AGAINST THE IMPERIALISTS SIMILAR TO THE EARLIER IRAQI COMMUNIQUE TO WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD DRAWN MY ATTENTION (PARA 2 OF MYTEL UNDER REFERENCE). AS WITH IRAQ, THE SOVIET UNION WAS HELPING TO PROMOTE A NATIONAL FRONT IN SYRIA AND RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SYRIAN BAATH AND COMMUNIST PARTIES.

2. MIRFENDEREWski MENTIONED SIMILAR SOVIET MOVES IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH WERE SURELY PART OF AN OVERALL PROGRAMME. IN THE LEBANON THERE HAD BEEN REPORTS (FROM ISRAELI SOURCES) OF A VISIT OF A CPSU DELEGATION ON 7 JANUARY, OF ANOTHER DELEGATION FROM MOSCOW ON 24 JANUARY, AND OF THE SOVIET MINISTER OF EXTERNAL TRADE EARLIER THIS MONTH TO SIGN A TREATY OF COMMERCE AND TOURISM. IN THE SUDAN, THE RUSSIANS WERE APPARENTLY MAKING UP FOR THEIR REVERSAL BY SENDING A NEW

/AMBASSADOR

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AMBASSADOR. THE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ WERE, OF COURSE, OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO IRAN. THEY HAD JUST HAD A REPORT (PROBABLY FROM ISRAELI SOURCES) THAT IRAQ WAS OPENING A CONSULATE-GENERAL IN BAKU.

3. UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WAS A PATTERN IN ALL THIS. THE RUSSIANS WERE EMBARKING ON A MORE ACTIVE POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT WHAT WERE THEIR OBJECTIVES ? THEY DID NOT WANT TO SEE A WAR THERE. PERHAPS THEY NOW SOUGHT TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION BY SUPPORTING THE ARABS' CAUSE OVER A WIDER FIELD. BUT WHERE WOULD THIS LEAD ? IRAQ'S GROWING HOSTILITY TOWARDS IRAN COULD BE PARTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO HER CLOSER CONTACTS WITH, AND SUPPORT FROM, THE SOVIET UNION. NO DOUBT THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE EQUALLY WORRYING FOR BRITAIN WITH HER IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE AREA. WE SHOULD STICK TOGETHER AND WATCH THE SITUATION CLOSELY. BUT WHAT COULD BE DONE TO PREVENT A DANGEROUS SITUATION ARISING ? PERHAPS THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH COULD WARN THE RUSSIANS OF THE RISKS OF ENCOURAGING THE ARABS IN THIS WAY.

4. I SAID THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SEEKING TO WIDEN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT WAS STILL TOO EARLY TO SEE WHAT WERE THE PRECISE OBJECTIVES, BUT THERE WERE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES, AND I MENTIONED THOSE SUGGESTED IN PARA 5 OF MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO. 296. I ALSO GAVE MIRFENDERESKI THE GIST OF THE COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET/SYRIAN COMMUNIQUE IN THAT TELEGRAM. HE AGREED THAT THERE WERE PROBABLY SEVERAL MOTIVES BEHIND THE SOVIET POLICY SEMICOLON STRONG ONE BEING THE DESIRE TO PRE-EMPT CHINESE CHAMPIONING OF THE MORE MILITANT ARAB COUNTRIES.

5. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS EXCHANGE, I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE BRIEF FOR MY AUDIENCE WITH THE SHAH ON 8 MARCH (PARA : 6 OF MY TEL. UNDER REFERENCE) COULD ALSO COVER THE WIDER PICTURE.

FCO PASS SAVING ADDRESSEES.

RAMSBOTHAM.

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British Embassy
Tehran

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- 8 MAR 1972

NEQ 3/303/1

Your reference

B Smith Esq
Near Eastern Department
FCO

Our reference 10/11 (copy for 3/14)

Date 24 February 1972

Dear Sir,

IRAQI/SOVIET RELATIONS

When the Ambassador gave the Foreign Minister the amended copy of the paper "Soviet Maritime Expansion" (FCO tel No 111 of 2 February, not to Moscow), Mr Khalatbari said that he wished to tell us of a development of which he had only just had a report. A new fishing agreement had just been concluded between the Iraqi and Soviet Governments. The latter had extended a loan to Iraq to enable her to purchase deep sea fishing vessels (specifically not coastal). The same agreement provided for the loan by the USSR to Iraq of two deep sea fishing vessels while the Iraqi vessels were being built. It also provided for the building of cold storage facilities in Iraq, probably at Basra.

2. Mr Khalatbari asked whether we had information about this or whether we could add anything to his report. The Ambassador promised to see what we could supply, but we cannot find any information here. Is there anything you can let us know about it?

Yours in
thgr
H J Arbutnott

Copied to:-

Chancery
MOSCOW

Min Beckett 13/29/2

M. Hulst (EESD)

Do we have anything?

I have not seen anything

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RD (SS) 16/7

to see

No trace

Dec 3

17/2

12/2

CRK.
Any trace
in SWD
or Soviet
press?



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

H J Arbuthnott Esq
British Embassy
TEHRAN

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 3/303/1

Date 8 March 1972

IRAQI/SOVIET RELATIONS

1. In your letter 10/11 of 24 February you asked whether we knew anything about a new fishing agreement which Mr Khalatbari said had just been concluded between the Iraqi and Soviet Governments.
2. We have checked this with the relevant Departments in the Office; none of us have been able to find any reference to it, nor have we been able to find any trace of it in the Soviet press.

Brian Smith
Near Eastern Department

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TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 130 OF 6 MARCH INFO MOSCOW
BEIRUT KUWAIT BAHRAIN EMBASSY ABU DHABI DUBAI ALGIERS TRIPOLI
WASHINGTON AND PEKING.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 159 AND 180: SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST.

1. YOU WILL RECEIVE, IN THIS WEEK'S BAG, OUR UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT
OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ. YOU SHOULD REGARD THE FIRST NINE
PARAGRAPHS AS FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY. YOU MAY, HOWEVER,
DRAW FREELY ON PARAGRAPHS 10 TO 12 (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE
FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 11) IN TALKING WITH THE SHAH OR SENIOR
IRANIAN OFFICIALS.

2. OUR ASSESSMENT OF SADAM HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO MOSCOW (YOUR
TELEGRAM NO 159) WAS SENT TO YOU LAST WEEK. YOU MAY DRAW FREELY
ON THIS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PARAGRAPH 4 (REPEAT4).

3. YOU WILL GATHER FROM THE ABOVE THAT WE CONTINUE TO TAKE A
SOMEWHAT LESS PESSIMISTIC VIEW THAN DO THE IRANIANS.

4. WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE SPECIFIC POINTS RAISED
WITH YOU BY KHALATBARI (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 159):

I. (YOUR PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3) WE AGREE THAT THE IRANIANS ARE
READING TOO MUCH INTO THE PASSAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON "UNITY OF
ACTION OF THE ARAB STATES". THIS THEME HAS BEEN STANDARD IN
SOVIET PROPAGANDA FOR SOME TIME AND IS A REFLECTION OF SOVIET
AWARENESS THAT THE ARAB WORLD IS SERIOUSLY WEAKENED BY THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS PREVENTS THEM FROM
ADOPTING COMMON POLICIES EITHER TOWARDS ISRAEL OR THE WEST. SUCH
STATEMENTS ARE AN IMPLIED CRITICISM OF ARAB WAYWARDNESS RATHER
THAN AN INDICATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO ESTABLISH A
UNITED FRONT OF ALL ARAB COUNTRIES.

II. (YOUR PARAGRAPH 4) OUR COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED TREATY ARE
CONTAINED IN THE ASSESSMENT ON THE VISIT AS A WHOLE. DESPITE THE
IRAQI AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS REPORTED IN MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO 305
WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF THERE WERE SOME DELAY IN THE SIGNATURE.

III. (YOUR PARAGRAPH 5) WE AGREE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY
TO USE THESE FACILITIES: BUT THEY WOULD PROBABLY USE THEM FOR
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES RATHER THAN FOR OVERT MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

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/5. (YOUR TELEGRAM

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5. (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 180, PARAGRAPH 5) WE AGREE BROADLY WITH THE COMMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO 296. WE ARE AT PRESENT PREPARING AN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS GENERALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT WE REGRET THAT IT WILL NOT (NOT) BE READY IN TIME FOR YOUR AUDIENCE ON 8 MARCH. IN ANY CASE WE MAY WELL HAVE TO PREPARE A SANITISED VERSION FOR YOU TO USE. WE SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT ON THIS OCCASION YOU FOLLOW A SIMILAR LINE TO THAT TAKEN WITH MIRFENDERWSKI.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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DESKBY 071400Z MARCH.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 192 OF 7 MARCH

25

YOUR TEL NO 130: SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

1. FIRST SENTENCE: DO YOU MEAN JIC(A)(72)(N)17 OF 2 MARCH?
IF SO I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW AS NECESSARY ON PARA 9 (EXCLUDING
LAST SENTENCE) AS WELL AS PARAS 10-12. DO YOU AGREE?

RAMSBOTHAM.

FILES
NED
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS

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IMMEDIATE

TOP COPY

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FM FCO 071845Z

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DESKBY 080430Z

TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TEL NO 139 OF 7 MARCH

YOUR TELNO 192: SOVIET EXPANSION. — (26)

YOU MAY USE THE FIRST THREE SENTENCES OF PARA 9 BUT WE WOULD PREFER YOU TO AVOID USING THE FOURTH SENTENCE. UNTIL WE HAVE FULLER EVIDENCE WE SHOULD NOT WISH TO CONVEY IT TO THE SHAH AS OUR CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THERE MIGHT BE SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE RUSSIANS WOULD PUT THEIR INTERESTS IN IRAQ ABOVE THOSE IN IRAN. NOR SHOULD YOU USE THE LAST SENTENCE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES
N.E.D.
E.E.S.D.
MR LE QUESNE
MR PARSONS

CONFIDENTIAL

ms

RESTRICTED



BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

16 March 1972

3/7

28

VG

J C Kay Esq
Near Eastern Department
FCO

Dear Kay.

SOVIET UNION AND IRAQ

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

21 MAR 1972

NEQ3/303/t

Enter

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1. Please refer to the final paragraph of my letter 3/7 of today's date in which I reported the first reference in the Soviet Press to a visit from a delegation of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. This morning's Pravda carries a very short announcement that the delegation, which was here at the invitation of the Central Committee, left Moscow on the 15 March. The report does not say when they arrived but judging from the fact that they appear also to have visited industrial, agricultural and Party organisations in Leningrad and Kiev, their visit lasted at least a week. If I hear any more about the delegation's visit I will let you know.

*Sincerely
Michael Robinson.*

M J Robinson

c.c. EESD, FCO
Chancery, Baghdad.

ps

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BRITISH EMBASSY

MOSCOW

16 March 1972

3/7

M. Burton to see o/a

J C Kay Esq
Near Eastern Department
FCO

REGISTRY NO. 10
21 MAR 1972

NEQ 3/303/2

Copy to Research Dept
Assessment Staff

copies sent B.H. 21/3

See (28)

Dear Kay

Given
EEFD
NAFD. in holding.
Mr Kay

K20/3

SOVIET UNION/IRAQ/SYRIA

As a follow up to the Syrian and Iraqi visits a number of articles have appeared in the press over the last few days throwing more light on Soviet attitudes towards these countries and particularly towards Iraq.

2. A Pravda commentary column by Demchenko on 11 March calling for unity of action of progressive Arab states both internally and amongst themselves, made an interesting comparison between the various measures taken by the Egyptians, the Syrians and the Iraqis in the interests of creating a unified political front. The Egyptians were said to be introducing "a whole complex of measures" designed to strengthen the national front and the unity of the popular masses. The Syrians had clearly gone a good deal further than this. The formation of a Syrian national front consisting of the Ba'ath Party, the Syrian communist party and the ASU and other organisations, was described as "an event of large-scale importance", unrivalled in the history of the country and having considerable importance for the future. On Iraq, on the other hand, the writer noted "a serious political evolution has been going on recently. Events in this country are also developing in the direction of the consolidation of democratic forces." There then followed an account of the nine-year history of the Kurdish question ending with the 11 March 1970 cease-fire and the manifesto on the national rights of the Iraqi Kurds. "After long alienation relations between the Kurdish leaders and the central authorities are beginning to sort themselves out." The establishment of peace in Kurdistan had made possible an improvement in the political climate in Iraq and facilitated the publication by the local Ba'ath Party of its national charter promising the creation of a national front of Ba'athists, communists and Kurds. Having referred to the determined stand of the Iraqis with the western oil companies, the article then concluded rather ambiguously: "The example of Iraq shows once more that an attack on the position of imperialism can be successful only in those cases where the national front is firm and the government is backed by the support of democratic forces."

3. The Pravda International Round-up on 12 March took up very much the same theme with Iraq again seeming to end up as the poor neighbour. Where Egypt was "consolidating her national front" and the Syrians were congratulated on the formation of a national front earlier in the week, in Iraq events were said to be "developing" in the direction of the unification of national patriotic forces into a common front.

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LAST PAPER

/4.

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4. Izvestia on 11 March also carried an article on Iraq which again seemed to adopt a rather ambiguous attitude towards the success of the 1970 manifesto in uniting the Kurds and the Arabs. On the one hand it explained how "not a little has already been done" in the way of developing the economy and political awareness of Kurdistan but, on the other hand, it made the point that after so much bloodshed it was difficult to reach a stage of mutual understanding, overcoming years of alienation and enmity. "One should not ignore the fact that imperialist forces and their agents are not interested in the consolidation of stability in Iraq. They would prefer it if enmity were again to flare up between the Arabs and the Kurds since this would serve the purpose of the imperialist monopolies." Nevertheless, the article concluded: "Life shows that the Arabs and the Kurds are interested in the carrying out of the March agreement and will bring into effect the principles declared on 11 March 1970. The Arab and Kurdish peoples are fully determined to overcome all obstacles standing in their path."

5. The appearance of two articles dealing to a greater or lesser extent with the Kurdish question on the second anniversary of 11 March manifesto is not in itself exceptional (Pravda last year marked the anniversary with a special report from Baghdad with photographs about the state of Arab/Kurdish relations); but the less than favourable comparison of Iraq with Syria and Egypt in the first Pravda article and the implication in the Izvestia article that the Kurdish problem is still capable of reactivating itself strike us as being rather unusual bearing in mind all the signs of recent improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq. In the circumstances one might have expected this year's anniversary to have been used as an occasion for confirming this improvement rather than for raking over past problems and disagreements which is inevitably what these two articles appear to be doing. Whilst it is of course dangerous to conclude too much from these two isolated articles, nonetheless it is tempting to wonder whether their rather luke-warm compliments do not have some bearing on the progress of talks which are believed to be taking place on the drawing up of a Soviet/Iraqi treaty.

6. Apart from the articles referred to above the Soviet press has carried a one-sentence report of a reception at the Iraqi Embassy on 11 March to celebrate the second anniversary of the Kurdish manifesto and a report of a meeting on 13 March at the Moscow House of Friendship to celebrate the same anniversary. The second report listed amongst those present a delegation of Iraqi Ba'ath Party workers headed by a member of the leadership of the Central Euphrates Regional Party Organisation, Badri Kerim Al-Kalkawi. This was the first official mention in the press of the presence of the Ba'ath Party delegation in the Soviet Union.

Johns in curly
Michael Robinson

Copied: EESD
Chancery Baghdad
Beirut
Cairo

(M J Robinson)

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Saddam Hussein Leads Iraqi Governmental Delegation On A Visit To The Soviet Union. Visits Of Government Delegations From Iraq To Soviet Union. 10 Feb. 1972. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1730. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477520/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=1e8434d5&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.